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Abstract 
We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals “think 
coarsely”: they group situations into categories, and apply the same model of inference to 
all situations within a category.  Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders 
take advantage of:  (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational 
content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where 
it is not, and (ii) framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals’ 
choice of category.  The model sheds light on uninformative advertising and product 
branding, as well as on some otherwise anomalous evidence on mutual fund advertising. 
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1.  Introduction 
Most societies devote huge resources to persuasion (McCloskey and Klamer 
1995).  Selling, advertising, political campaigns, organized religion, law, much of the 
media, and some education are devoted to changing beliefs in a way advantageous to the 
persuader.  Persuasion is not simply an expenditure of resources: the content of the 
message crucially shapes its effectiveness
2.  But what constitutes persuasive content? 
  Economists usually assume that only one type of persuasive content matters: 
objectively useful information. Stigler (1987, p. 243) defines advertising as “the 
provision of information about the availability and quality of a commodity.”  Economists 
typically model persuasion, including advertising (Stigler 1961), political campaigns 
(Downs 1957), or legal argument (Milgrom and Roberts 1986b; Dewatripont and Tirole 
1999) as provision of information. In some models, such as Crawford and Sobel (1982), 
Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004), Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980), 
Milgrom (1981), Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990), and Holden and 
Kamenica (2006), the persuader uses information strategically, but conveys information 
nonetheless. 
  Psychologists and marketers understand persuasion quite differently.  They argue 
that people evaluate various propositions or objects using representativeness, metaphors, 
analogies, and more generally associative strategies (Gilovich 1981; Edelman 1982; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Lakoff 1987; Zaltman 1997).  The strategy of persuasion is 
to take advantage of these mental strategies, which we refer to as coarse thinking, to 
improve the audience’s assessment of the persuader’s issue or product. 
                                                 
2 A vast advertising literature makes this point (see, e.g., Zaltman 1997; Sutherland and Sylvester 2000).  
Bertrand et al. (2006) present some clear evidence that persuasive content matters in a field experiment 
using loan advertisements by a South African consumer lending institution. 3 
  In this paper, we present a model of coarse thinking and persuasion.  We 
distinguish two ways in which persuaders, such as product advertisers, can take 
advantage of coarse thinking.  First, the audience might already have some analogy or 
model of this product in mind; it already thinks of this product in terms of something 
else.  In this case, one way to persuade is to advertise attributes of the product that are 
positively related to quality in the analogous situation.  The coarse thinker transfers the 
informational content of these attributes across analogous situations, and so improves his 
view of the product.  We call this form of coarse thinking transference.       
Second, and more fundamentally, persuaders may themselves try to shape or 
create the relevant analogy by advertising attributes associated with that desired analogy.  
This method persuades successfully when it changes the lens through which a thinker 
views all features of the product.  Following Goffman (1974), we call this form of coarse 
thinking “framing.”  In many instances, successful persuasion takes advantage of both 
transference and framing, but these forms of coarse thinking are conceptually distinct
3.        
To illustrate these ideas, consider several examples:   
Alberto Culver Natural Silk Shampoo was advertised with a slogan “We put silk 
in the bottle.”  The shampoo actually contained some silk.  During the campaign, the 
company spokesman conceded that “silk doesn’t really do anything for hair” (Carpenter, 
Glazer and Nakamoto 1994).
4  This example is a relatively pure case of the persuader 
relying on transference.  Culver takes advantage of the co-categorization of shampoo 
with hair, which leads consumers to value ”silk” in shampoo (not very sensible) because 
                                                 
3 Recently, the term framing has been used much more narrowly to describe the coding of gains and losses 
in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Goffman’s original and broader meaning of framing as 
a lens or “model” through which the audience interprets data is what we try to capture below.   
4A recent reincarnation of this marketing idea, discovered by inspecting products in a drugstore, is Pure 
Cashmere Softsoap, which contains “cashmere extract.”  Cashmere adds quality to sweaters not soap.  4 
they value “silky” in hair.   By adding silk to the bottle, Culver effectively transfers a 
positive trait from hair to shampoo to make its product more attractive. 
For about forty years, Avis Car Rental advertised itself with a slogan “We are 
number two.  We try harder.”  Besides this key message, most ads contain little data.  We 
think of this campaign as a relatively pure case of framing.  When Avis was getting 
started, many of its potential customers knew that it was smaller than Hertz.  How the 
attribute “being second” is interpreted depends on categorization: either negatively as a 
loser or positively as an underdog.  Since the underdog image favors Avis, the campaign 
primed this frame by stressing the attributes of underdogs (they try harder).  The fact that 
Avis lagged behind Hertz in sales became a sign of higher rather than lower quality.    
Most persuasive messages take advantage of both transference and framing.  Take 
two examples, one from the economic and one from the political sphere.  
Over the course of the internet stock market bubble (1994-2003), the brokerage 
firm Merrill Lynch ran six advertising campaigns, respectively called “a tradition of 
trust”, “the difference is Merrill Lynch,” “human achievement,” “be bullish,” “ask 
Merrill,” and “total Merrill.”  The motto of each campaign always appeared in the ad.  
Roughly speaking, the first two campaigns preceded the bubble, the third and the fourth 
appeared during it, and the last two ran after the sharp market decline.   
  One way to compare these campaigns is to look at a representative ad from each.  
“A tradition of trust” ads often portray a grandfather and a grandson fishing together.  
The ads talk about slow accumulation of wealth and Merrill’s expertise.  The activities of 
fishing and, even more so, teaching to fish suggest slowness, tradition, skill, consistency, 
and patience.  The ads advise on how to protect oneself and one’s family financially.  Ads 5 
from “the difference is Merrill Lynch” campaign likewise show grandfathers and 
grandsons with fishing rods, and recommend saving.  
This message changes in 1999.  A “human achievement” ad from 1999 shows a 
12 year old girl wearing a helmet and carrying a skate board.  The image is much hipper 
than those from the previous campaigns.  The next campaign, from 2000-2001, simply 
intones: “be bullish”.  One ad shows a Merrill Lynch bull wired as a semiconductor board 
(the word “wired” itself has two meanings, connected and hyperactive).  The theme of 
protection is gone; growth and opportunity emerge, unfettered by data.   
After the market declines, Merrill switches to the “ask Merrill” campaign, with its 
emphasis on uncertainty in the world, and the company’s expertise in protecting and 
advising its customers.  A representative ad is dominated by a page-size question mark, 
invoking insecurity, uncertainty, and the need for answers.  Finally, by the end of the 
decade, the firm moves to the “total Merrill” campaign, with its familiar emphasis on 
expertise and intergenerational fishing. 
 Merrill’s campaigns take advantage of both transference and framing.  In quieter 
markets, Merrill seeks to frame or position itself as an expert and adviser, much like a 
doctor or a grandfather teaching his grandson to fish. It then wants the audience to 
transfer the positive attributes of this expert to enhance the perceived value of its own 
advice.  At the peak of the bubble, Merrill recognizes that many investors are seeking to 
get rich quickly, to grab the opportunities created by the technology boom.   It then 
frames itself as the agent of such opportunities, and wants the audience to transfer the 
positive attributes of “technology” to its own services.   After the crash of the bubble, the 
patient advisor again becomes an attractive frame.    6 
As a final example – from the area of political persuasion -- consider Arnold 
Schwarzenegger’s memorable speech at the 2004 Republican National Convention.  In 
the best remembered part of his speech, Schwarzenegger defended free trade:  “To those 
critics who are so pessimistic about our economy, I say: Don’t be economic girlie men!...  
Now they say India and China are overtaking us.  Don’t you believe it.  We may hit a few 
bumps – but America always moves ahead. That’s what Americans do.” 
Schwarzenegger’s speech takes advantage of both framing and transference.  He 
frames international trade as war, with winners or losers, not as an economic model in 
which everyone gains.   With this frame in mind, he transfers America’s as well as his 
own (a former champion as well as The Terminator) propensity to win onto trade.  This 
message of victory, while helpful for assessing US military engagements and 
Schwarzenegger’s own accomplishments, is of limited value in evaluating globalization.    
We will come back to these examples as we discuss our analytical results.  In our 
model, individuals deviate from Bayesian rationality in two crucial ways: first, they 
group situations into categories based on the data they receive and, second, they fail to 
differentiate between co-categorized situations and use one model of inference for all 
situations in the same category.  Such coarse thinking allows the persuader to create 
uninformative messages that frame the interpretation of public information (laggard in 
car rentals) through category choice (underdog).  Coarse thinking also allows the 
persuader to take advantage of transference by creating messages (we will win) that are 
uninformative in the relevant situation (free trade) but still induce a reaction because they 
are informative in the co-categorized one (war).   7 
The model presented in this paper shares many elements with Crawford and 
Sobel’s (1982) model of strategic information transmission.  Indeed, our model of 
transference is mathematically similar to an extension of Crawford and Sobel in which 
the audience does not know the exact situation (the underlying game being played), and 
so may react to messages that do not contain decision-relevant information in the relevant 
situation.
5  On the other hand, framing through category choice does not have a natural 
counterpart in the cheap talk literature.  Even if we focus on transference, our 
interpretation of the underlying mathematics is very different.  We suppose that the 
audience knows the situation it is in, but uses one model of inference to interpret 
information in multiple situations.   We do not think that the audience reacts to the 
message “contains silk” because it is uncertain whether adding silk improves the 
shampoo.  Rather, we suggest that the audience thinks coarsely and reacts to the message 
“contains silk” because it interprets messages about shampoo and hair similarly. 
Associational or analogical thinking is both extremely common, and extremely 
useful in everyday life, because it reduces the evaluation of new situations to comparison 
with familiar ones.  Edelman (1992) thinks that, for this reason, our brains have evolved 
so as to make metaphor and analogy standard hard-wired forms of reasoning.  Of course, 
the patterns of thought that are usually extremely helpful are not always so.  Persuaders 
                                                 
5 Crawford (2003) presents a cheap talk model in which uncertainty surrounding the Sender’s type (e.g., 
whether or not he is strategic) may enable a strategic Sender to “fool” a sophisticated Receiver into taking a 
suboptimal action in equilibrium.  Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) present a related model that 
incorporates the possibility of equilibrium deception or misinterpretation of information.  They extend the 
basic cheap talk model by assuming that a fraction of the Sender’s audience misinterprets equilibrium 
messages with some non-equilibrium based rule (e.g., they always blindly believe the Sender’s 
recommendation).  In the equilibria they identify, the Sender always sends an inflated message that 
deceives the “naïve” agents.   
 8 
take advantage of people utilizing a strategy which, though generally useful, may not be 
useful in the situation of interest to the persuader.
6  
A large literature looking at persuasion deals with advertising.  Nelson (1974) 
broadens the range of what might be seen as informative advertising.
7  Stigler and Becker 
(1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993) put advertising into the utility function.  Gabaix 
and Laibson (2006) and Shapiro (2006) offer behavioral models of advertising.  Recent 
research on persuasion has gone beyond advertising, and includes studies of hatred 
(Glaeser 2005), media (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2002, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 
2006; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007), and political persuasion (Becker 2001; Murphy and 
Shleifer 2004; Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro 2005).   As far as we know, our paper is 
the first to study persuasion in a model of associative thinking so central to psychological 
work. 
The next section outlines our model of coarse thinking, and compares Bayesian 
and coarse decision makers.  Section 3 presents the results on persuasion, showing how 
the persuader takes advantage of transference and framing.  Section 4 uses the model to 
understand a crucial aspect of marketing, namely product branding.  Section 5 applies the 
ideas of the model to the case of mutual fund advertising, and presents some evidence on 
such advertising during the internet bubble.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6 Economic theory has also considered analogical reasoning in thinking both about how individuals forecast 
the payoffs to different actions under uncertainty (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1995) and about how they 
forecast opponents’ strategies in game theoretic environments (Eyster and Rabin 2005; Jehiel 2005).   
Ettinger and Jehiel (2007) apply Jehiel’s equilibrium concept to a model similar to Crawford’s (2003) and 
show how a strategic Sender can exploit the fact that a Receiver who thinks coarsely about strategies may 
misinterpret the Sender’s actions in equilibrium.  
7 Research following Nelson (1974) (e.g., Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984; Milgrom and Roberts 1986a) 
focuses on how, in equilibrium, the amount of advertising may signal quality.  This literature does not 
make predictions regarding the equilibrium content of advertisements.   9 
2.  Model 
Basic setup 
An individual must assess the quality of a given object, such as a shampoo, a 
mutual fund, or a political candidate.  We denote this underlying quality of the object by 
∈ qQ , where Q  is some subset of    .  In assessing the quality of the object, the 
individual faces one of three similar, but not identical, observable situations  ∈{0,1,2} s .  
For instance, s = 0 could be “selecting a mutual fund”, s = 1 could be “selecting a 
professional service”, and s = 2 could be “grabbing an opportunity”.  Our analysis 
pertains to the assessment of quality in situation s = 0.   
The individual observes a piece of public information  ∈{, } ru d sent by nature that 
is potentially informative about q.  The public information is meant to capture any piece 
of data available to the audience that cannot be controlled by a persuader.  For instance, r 
could stand for past stock market performance and u and d could stand for up and down 
respectively.  Later, the individual receives a potentially informative message 
∈{,} ma b about q. In situation s = 0, this message is sent by a persuader who privately 
observes signal  ∈{,} x abprior to sending m, but in situations s = 1 and s = 2 nature sends 
signal  m = x directly.  The individual then uses ( , ) rm to form expectations about 
underlying quality.   
The timeline of the individual’s decision problem in s = 0 is given in Figure 1. 
Bayesian Thinking 
The underlying joint distribution function over quality, public information, private 
signals, and situations is  p(q,r,x,s) and is common knowledge.  We assume that the 
induced joint probability mass function of public information and private signals 10 
conditional on situations,  p(r,x | s), satisfies  p(r,x | s) > 0 for each r, x, and s.  We also 
assume that the marginal probability mass of situations,  p(s), satisfies 
p(s = 0)+ p(s =1) + p(s = 2)=1 and  p(s) > 0 for each s. 
The individual has beliefs about the probability mass of messages conditional on 
public information, private signals, and situations (i.e., beliefs about the strategy of the 
persuader and of nature),  ˆ σ(m|r,x,s).  These beliefs, combined with p, generate a joint 
probability distribution over quality, public information, private signals, messages and 
situations,  ˆ p(q,r,x,m,s).     
Prior to making some decision in s = 0, the individual uses ( , ) rm  to form an 
expectation of the underlying quality of the object.  Since the situation is observable, the 
updated Bayesian expectation of quality is  
  E[q |r,m,s = 0] = E[q |r,x',s = 0]ˆ p(x'|r,m,s = 0),
x'∈ a,b {} ∑  (2.1) 
where E[q | r,x,s = 0] is calculated using p and ˆ p(x |r,m,s = 0) is uniquely derived from 
p and  ˆ σ  using Bayes’ rule whenever possible (otherwise it is an arbitrary distribution). 
To study the efficacy of persuasion, it is useful to examine the marginal effect of 
the message sent by the persuader on the individual’s assessment of quality conditional 
on public information r.  We define the Bayesian’s reaction to m to be the difference 
between the Bayesian’s expectation of quality prior to receiving a message from the 
persuader and his expectation of quality after receiving the message.  Hence, the 
Bayesian’s reaction, E[q | r,m,s = 0]− E[q | r,s = 0], is given by 
  ˆ p(a | r,m,s = 0)− p(a |r,s = 0) () E[q |r,a,s = 0]− E[q |r,b,s = 0] ( ) (2.2) 11 
As illustrated in equation (2.2), the Bayesian’s reaction to m is the product of two 
terms: (i) the revision in the probability placed on the persuader’s private signal being x = 
a as a result of the message and (ii) the extent to which the conditional expectation of 
quality is different under private signal x = a than under x = b.  Thus, the Bayesian only 
reacts to a message when he believes both that it is informative about the persuader’s 
private signal and that the private signal is predictive of quality.     
When  =≠ = [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ] Eq rms Eq rs , we say that message m is informative in s 
= 0 given r; when  = == [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ] Eq rms Eq rs , we say that message m is 
uninformative in s = 0 given r.   The message m = “looks silky” is informative in 
situation  s = “evaluating hair” when it comes from a trustworthy source but m = 
“contains silk” is always uninformative in situation s = “evaluating a shampoo” because 
silk does not affect the quality of shampoo.  A Bayesian would react to m = “silk” in the 
former situation but not in the latter. 
 
 Coarse Thinking 
The first essential assumption in our model is that different pieces of data may 
prime different mental representations or categorizations.  For example, the 
advertisement “be bullish” may lead individuals to think of investing with Merrill Lynch 
as grabbing an opportunity to get rich.  They then interpret decision-relevant information 
about Merrill accordingly. 
The second essential assumption is that individuals do not have separate mental 
representations for every situation.  Instead, they have only one representation for all the 
situations in a category and are effectively unable to differentiate between these 12 
situations.  If individuals perceive foreign trade as a kind of war, they interpret the 
message “Americans are likely to win” in the same way when assessing globalization and 
military conflict.  Categorical thinking has been modeled by Mullainathan (2000), Fryer 
and Jackson (2004), and Peski (2006)
8; we rely most closely on Mullainathan (2000). 
Specifically, we assume that coarse thinkers either group situation s = 0 together 
with similar situation s = 1, denoted by categorization  { } ≡ 1 0,1 C , or group situation s = 
0 together with similar situation s = 2, denoted by categorization  { } ≡ 2 0,2 C .  They can 
think of investing with Merrill Lynch as grabbing an opportunity, or as hiring 
professional advice.  Crucially, we assume that coarse thinkers do not have a separate 
mental representation for s = 0 and that they cannot group s = 0 together with both s = 1 
and s = 2 at the same time.  The latter assumption could arise out of a richer model of 
associations where s = 1 and s = 2 are sufficiently dissonant.   
The assumption that coarse thinkers have the same mental representation for 
distinct situations is motivated by evidence from psychology. Krueger and Clement 
(1994) asked experimental participants to estimate the average temperatures of 48 
different days of the year.  Participants tended to under-estimate the difference between 
the average temperature of two days belonging to the same month (e.g., August 12
th and 
August 20
th) and to over-estimate the difference between the average temperature of two 
days belonging to neighboring months (e.g., August 25
th and September 2
nd).  Because 
months are mental categories, coarse thinkers may estimate temperatures to be more 
similar within months than across months.  
                                                 
8 There are some related finance models.  Barberis and Shleifer (2003) present a model in which some 
investors group risky assets into categories and do not distinguish among assets within a category when 
formulating their demand. Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007) present a model in which investors use simplified 
univariate theories to forecast dividends.  The theories investors use change over time in response to data.   13 
Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto (1994) asked experimental participants to rate 
the quality of hypothetical products described by a list of attributes.  Participants 
preferred products with irrelevant differentiating attributes (“alpine class fill” for down 
jackets) to products without such attributes even when told that such attributes are 
irrelevant.  One interpretation is that participants responded positively because alpine-
ness contains decision-relevant information in a similar situation, e.g., buying skis.  
The coarse thinker relies on categorization  1 C  or  2 C to form beliefs about quality.  
The specific categorization depends on the data received.  Denote the map between the 
data received and the chosen categorization by  × ∅→ 12 :{ , } { , , } { , } Cu d a b C C.  With a 
slight abuse of notation,  = ∅ (, ) (, ) rm r  denotes the information available to the 
individual prior to receiving the message from the persuader.   We assume that 
individuals choose the most likely category given the data received:
9 
10 
  C(r,m) = argmax
C∈ C1,C2 {}
ˆ p(s ∈C |r,m) for all (r,m)∈ u,d { }× ∅,a,b { } (2.3)  
and ignore the alternative category (Mullainathan 2000).  This map is meant to capture 
the idea that different mental representations or schema may be primed by different 
                                                 
9 Maximizing the expression in (2.3) is equivalent to solving 
max
s'∈{1,2}
ˆ p(s'|r,m) for all (r,m)∈ u,d {} × ∅,a,b { }since s = 0 is in both C1 and C2, where 















10 With multiple solutions to
{} { } { }
12 ,
ˆ max ( | , ) for some ( , ) , , ,
CC Cps C rm rm ud ab
∈ ∈∈ × ∅ , pick C1. 14 
stimuli.
11  For instance, an individual might associate – and therefore co-categorize - 
investing with Merrill Lynch with grabbing another opportunity when looking at the ad 
“be bullish” or with seeking professional advice when looking at “a tradition of trust.”  
The coarse thinker applies the same model of inference to all situations in the 
category  (, ) Crm.  One natural way to model coarse thinking is as Bayesian thinking with 
a coarser information set; i.e., the coarse thinker forms his beliefs about quality as a 
Bayesian who observes the category,  (, ) Crm, he is in but not the specific situation: 
  ˆ p(q | r,m,Ci) = ˆ p(q | r,m,s = 0)ˆ p(s = 0|r,m,Ci)+ ˆ p(q | r,m,s = i) ˆ p(s = i | r,m,Ci)(2.4)  
where  = (, ) i CC r m  for some  ∈{1, 2} i . 
This update rule (2.4) implies that, upon receiving ( , ) rm, the coarse thinker’s 
expectation of quality is: 
  E[q | r,m,Ci] = E[q | r,m,s = 0]ˆ p(s = 0|r,m,Ci)+ E[q | r,m,s = i]ˆ p(s = i | r,m,Ci)(2.5) 
An alternative way to model coarse thinking, which we actually follow, is to 
assume that the coarse thinker does not condition on the information received in 
weighing each situation, but instead uses constant weights  p(s |Ci).  Such a coarse 
thinker forms beliefs about quality according to the rule 
ˆ p
Ci(q |r,m,s = 0)= ˆ p(q |r,m,s = 0)p(s = 0|Ci)+ ˆ p(q |r,m,s = i)p(s = i |Ci) (2.6)   
where  = (, ) i CC r m  for some  ∈{1, 2} i . 
Update rule (2.6) implies that, upon receiving ( , ) rm, a coarse thinker’s 
expectation of quality is: 
  E
Ci[q |r,m,s = 0] = E[q |r,m,s = 0]p(s = 0|Ci)+ E[q |r,m,s = i]p(s = i |Ci)(2.7) 
                                                 
11 Smith (1998) reviews mental representation and psychological models of association.  The idea that the 
coarse thinker chooses the most likely category given the observed data and ignores alternative categories 
is motivated by experimental evidence (Murphy and Ross 1994; Malt, Ross, and Murphy 1995). 15 
These two models share many features.  Both capture the idea that the coarse 
thinker updates as if he cannot distinguish the situations within a category: Under each 
specification, the coarse thinker’s expectation of quality in s = 0 is a weighted average of 
the Bayesian’s expectation across all situations co-categorized with s = 0 given (r,m).  
In the first model, a coarse thinker weighs the expectation of quality in situation s by the 
likelihood of s in the category given the information received: ˆ p(s | r,m,Ci).  In the 
second, a coarse thinker weighs the expectation of quality in situation s by the likelihood 
of that situation in the category:  p(s |Ci).  In both models, a coarse thinker’s inference 
approaches the Bayesian’s as p(s = 0|Ci) tends to 1.   
We do not favor one model over the other based solely on psychological 
evidence.  Since the model of coarseness with weights  p(s |Ci) greatly simplifies the 
formulas and proofs, we focus on it in what follows.  We demonstrate in Appendix 2 that 
our main results hold with inessential modifications under the alternative assumption that 
coarse thinkers update using more “Bayesian” weights ˆ p(s | r,m,Ci).  
We are interested in how the coarse thinker reacts to the message sent by the 
persuader conditional on the public information r.  Fixing public information r, assume 
(without loss of generality) that the coarse thinker co-categorizes situation s = 0 with 
situation s = 1 before receiving the persuader’s message. That is, let  ≡∅ () (, ) Cr Cr  and 
assume that = 1 () Cr C.  Then, the coarse thinker’s expectation of quality is  =
1[|, 0 ]
C Eq r s  
(as given by (2.7)) before receiving a message from the persuader.   
To evaluate the coarse thinker’s reaction to m, we distinguish the cases where the 
coarse thinker either does or does not re-categorize situation s = 0 after receiving the 
persuader’s message.  We say that message m is pivotal given r if 16 
  ≠ (, ) () Crm Cr (2.8) 
Message m is pivotal given r if it leads the coarse thinker to re-categorize situation s = 0. 
First, consider the case where m is not pivotal given r.  In this case, the model 
produces empirically plausible patterns of under- and over-reaction to data relative to the 
Bayesian benchmark.  Comparing the magnitude of the coarse thinker’s reaction to m, 
=− =
11 [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ]
CC Eq r m s Eq r s , to the Bayesian’s,  = −= [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ] Eq rms Eq rs , 
suggests two distortions.  First, since  = < 1 (0 | ) 1 ps C , the reaction of the coarse thinker 
only mutedly depends on his reaction to message m in situation s=0 itself, as measured 
by  E[q | r,m,s = 0]− E[q | r,s = 0]. This effect can lead to an under-reaction to data.   
Take, for example, the case where  = ≠= [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ] Eq rms Eq rs , so m is informative 
given r in s = 0, and  = == [|,, 1 ] [|, 1 ] Eq rms Eq rs , so m is uninformative given r in 
=1 s .  We see here that 
=− = = =− = =
<= − =
11
1 [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ] [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ]( 0 | )
[|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ]
CC E qrms E qrs Eqrms Eqrs ps C
Eq rms Eq rs
  
Coarse thinking leads to an under-reaction to news relative to Bayesian thinking. The 
uninformativeness of the data in the co-categorized situation dilutes its impact in situation 
s = 0 precisely because the current situation is under-weighted in the update rule.   
  However, continuing to consider the case where m is not pivotal given r, the 
coarse thinker’s response also depends on a term that the Bayesian’s does not depend on: 
the informativeness of the message in the other situation  =1 s  in the same category.  This 
implies that the coarse thinker could react to non-information or over-react to 
information.  Take, for example, the case where  = == [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ] Eq rms Eq rs , but 17 
=≠ = [|,, 1 ] [|, 1 ] Eq rms Eq rs : the message m is uninformative in situation s = 0 given r, 
but is informative in co-categorized situation  =1 s .  Then, 
 




1 [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ] [|,, 1 ] [|, 1 ]( 1 | )
[|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ]
0
CC E qrms E qrs E qrms E qrs p s C
Eq rms Eq rs  (2.9) 
 
The coarse thinker now reacts to an uninformative message in situation s = 0 
because it is informative in the co-categorized situation.  His use of the same model to 
interpret messages in all situations in the category may lead him to over-react to non-
informative messages.  This, we suggest, is part of what a person responding to “We put 
silk in the bottle” is doing.  We call this process transference.  This transference of the 
informational content of messages across situations within a category drives the first set 
of our results below.  Indeed, if the persuader cannot affect how individuals categorize a 
situation, the strategy of uninformative persuasion is to trigger such transference: 
successful persuasion in that case takes advantage of over-reaction. 
Now consider the case where message m is pivotal given public information r, so 
m leads to the re-categorization of s = 0 from  1 C  to  2 C .  Comparing the magnitude of the 
coarse thinker’s reaction to m when categorization depends on the message received, 
=− =
21 [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ]
CC Eq r m s Eq r s , to that when categorization is fixed, 
=− =
11 [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ]
CC Eq r m s Eq r s , highlights additional effects from re-categorization.  
Since message m leads to the re-categorization of s = 0 from  1 C to  2 C , the coarse 
thinker’s reaction now depends on more than the informativeness of that message about 
quality in some situation.  To take an extreme example, the coarse thinker may react to m 18 
even when it is uninformative about quality in all situations because it affects how he 
categorizes s = 0.  To see this, take the case where m is uninformative about quality in all 
situations, but where the expectation of quality conditional on r in category  2 C is different 
from that in category  1 C :  = [|,,] [|,] E qrms E qrs for all s, but 
=≠ =
21 [|, 0 ] [|, 0 ]
CC E qrs E qrs
12.  When message m prompts the coarse thinker to re-
categorize s = 0 from  1 C to  2 C , the magnitude of his reaction to m is: 
E
C2[q |r,m,s = 0]− E
C1[q |r,s = 0] = E
C2[q |r,s = 0]− E
C1[q |r,s = 0]
> E
C1[q |r,m,s = 0]− E
C1[q |r,s = 0]
= 0
(2.10) 
The coarse thinker reacts to the message because it affects how he categorizes 
situation s = 0, not because it is informative about quality in any situation.  We call this 
phenomenon framing.  “We try harder” frames Avis as an underdog.  The message itself 
is uninformative about quality in all situations, but it encourages the re-categorization of 
Avis from loser to underdog, so public information (Avis lags behind Hertz in sales) 
becomes an indicator of higher quality.  When the persuader can influence categorization,  
uninformative persuasion optimally frames that situation in the mind of the audience. 
In summary, we have presented a simple model that naturally describes two 
manifestations of coarse thinking: framing and transference.  Framing refers to how the 
                                                 
12 Applying the definition of E
Ci[q |r,s = 0]and rearranging terms, 
E
C2[q | r,s = 0]≠ E
C1[q |r,s = 0]if and only if 
E[q | r,s = 0] p(s = 0|C2)− p(s = 0|C1) () ≠ E[q | r,s =1]p(s =1|C1)− E[q | r,s = 2]p(s = 2|C2).
It is clear that this inequality holds for a wide range of parameter values.  For instance, if 
E[q | r,s = 0]= 0 and  p(s =1|C1) = p(s = 2|C2) then the requirement is just that the public signal 
is interpreted differently in s = 2 than in s = 1: E[q | r,s = 2]≠ E[q |r,s =1] . 19 
audience thinks about the data, transference refers to what it thinks about it by analogy.  
We show next how a rational persuader takes advantage of these mental strategies.  
       
3.  Persuasion 
Setup  
 Fixing public information  ∈{, } ru d , the persuader in situation s = 0 maximizes 
the individual’s expectation of quality, net of persuasion costs.  Presumably, the higher 
the expected quality, the greater the support the persuader receives, whether through 
sales, votes, or membership in his organization.  
The persuader can alter messages in situation s = 0.  Specifically, we assume that 
the persuader observes the signal x that the individual would see absent intervention (for 
example, absent an advertising campaign).  He can then either intervene prior to the 
individual’s observing x and send altered message  ∈{,} ma b  not equal to x at cost  ≥ 0 c , 
or simply report  = mx  at zero cost.  The individual then observes m and never sees the 
original x. 
As mentioned above, we make the simplifying assumption that nature directly 
sends the signal m = x in situations s = 1 and s = 2.  This should be a reasonable 
assumption if s = 1 and s = 2 are situations in which persuaders are restricted (e.g., by 
law) to truthfully reveal all private information.  Alternatively, s = 1 and s = 2 may be 
common, everyday situations in which there is no persuader to send an altered message 
(e.g., underdogs in many real-life situations observably try harder).  20 
Denote the persuader’s strategy in s = 0 by m0 : u,d { }× a,b { }→ a,b {} , where 
m0(r,x) = m represents the strategy of reporting message m  whenever the public 
information is r and the private signal is x.
14  Denote the corresponding “strategy” of 
nature in situations s = 1 and s = 2 by  m1(r,x) = m2(r,x) = x for all r and x since nature 
always reveals the private signal in those situations. 
An optimal strategy for the persuader in s = 0 selects an m to maximize his payoff 
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if the audience consists of coarse thinkers.   
Optimal strategies depend on how individuals respond to messages.  The standard 
assumption is that individuals are sophisticated, meaning that their beliefs are consistent 
with Bayes’ rule applied to the reporting strategies of the persuader and nature.  More 
formally, this implies the following restrictions on beliefs: 
(S)  ˆ p is derived from p and  ˆ σ(m |r,x,s) =
1 if ms(r,x) = m




 using Bayes’ rule 
whenever possible.
15  
                                                 
14 We restrict attention to pure strategies except in Appendix 2. 
15 When there exists a message m that is sent with zero probability under the persuader’s strategy in 
situation s = 0, relevant conditional beliefs about quality are derived from p,  ˆ σ , and an arbitrary 
distribution μ(x | r,m,s = 0) over {a,b}. 21 
An alternative to sophistication is that individuals take messages at face value: 
individuals, including both Bayesians and coarse thinkers, take the message m they see 
and update as if the persuader always non-strategically reveals the private signal x.  
Formally, this implies the following restriction on beliefs
17: 
(F)  ˆ p is derived from p and  ˆ σ(m |r,x,s) =
1 if m = x




 using Bayes’ rule.  
We will show that, given an additional assumption described below, it does not matter 
whether we assume that individuals are sophisticated or that they take messages at face 
value in considering the persuader’s optimal strategies. 
 
Definition:  An equilibrium (m0
*, ˆ p
*) satisfies: 
(1) For each (r,x) the persuader choosesm0
*(r,x)to maximize the audience’s 
expectation of quality minus costs of persuasion, as given by (3.1) if the audience 
consists of Bayesians and by (3.2) if the audience consists of coarse thinkers.  The 
persuader takes the audience’s beliefs  ˆ p
*as given. 
 (2)  ˆ p
*satisfies (S) given the reporting strategy of the persuader, m0 = m0
*, if the 
audience is sophisticated and (F) if the audience takes messages at face value. 
 
To simplify the remaining analysis as well as to focus on truly uninformative 
persuasion, we make the uninformative persuasion assumption: the signal the persuader 
privately observes is always uninformative about quality in s = 0: 
                                                 
17 Shin (1994) also refers to updating on ex ante probabilities as taking messages at face value.  Other 
authors (e.g., Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani 2007) refer to such updating as “naïve”. 22 
  E[q | r,x,s = 0]= E[q |r,s = 0] (3.3) 
for all r, x.  The uninformative persuasion assumption implies that all messages are 
uninformative in situation s = 0 by (2.2).  Hence, Bayesians never react to messages sent 
by the persuader in s = 0.  
Before characterizing the equilibria of this model, we establish the following 
useful result. 
Lemma:  Under our assumptions: 
(i)  Categorization rule (2.3) is independent of the persuader’s strategy.   
(ii)  Sophisticated and face value audiences hold the same expectations of quality 
conditional on messages whether they consist of Bayesians (with expectations 
given by (2.1)) or of coarse thinkers (with expectations given by (2.7)).   
(iii)  From (i) and (ii) it follows that m0
*is an equilibrium strategy for the persuader 
given some sophisticated beliefs if and only if it is an equilibrium strategy 
when the audience takes messages at face value. This is true whether the 
audience consists of Bayesians or of coarse thinkers. 
Proof:  In Appendix 1.  ■ 
This lemma establishes that, in considering the equilibrium strategies of the 
persuader, we can assume without loss of generality that the audience takes messages at 
face value.
18  The intuition is that face value and sophisticated individuals differ only in 
their beliefs regarding the equilibrium strategy of the persuader in s = 0.  Since the 
persuader’s underlying private signal is  uninformative about quality and categorization 
rule (2.3) is independent of the persuader’s strategy, these differences do not generate 
                                                 
18 This lemma does not hold when coarse thinkers update according to the “more Bayesian” rule explored 
in Appendix 2, where we focus on the sophisticated case. 23 
disagreement between face value and sophisticated thinkers in what messages imply 
about quality and hence do not affect the persuader’s best response. 
This lemma is useful since it implies that, to verify that m0
* is an equilibrium 
strategy for the persuader, we only need to check whether it maximizes the persuader’s 
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if the audience consists of Bayesians and by  
 
E
Ci[q |r,x = m,s = 0]       if m = x
E
Ci[q |r,x = m,s = 0]− c if m ≠ x
 (3.5)   
where Ci = argmax
C∈{C1,C2 }
p(s ∈C |r,x = m)if the audience consists of coarse thinkers.  In other 
words, this lemma establishes that it is unnecessary to compute consistent beliefs  ˆ p
*and 
make sure that the persuader’s strategy is a best response to those beliefs.  Rather, we can 
treat the audience’s beliefs as given by the ex ante probabilities in what follows. 
Additionally, the lemma implies that our results extend to environments where 
messages are verifiable.  The most literal interpretation of a message in situation s = 0 is 
as unverifiable and potentially costly talk (e.g., m = “We try harder” for s = Car Rental), 
in which case  ≠ mx  implies that the persuader paid a weakly positive cost to send an 
altered message or to engage in advertising.  However, the lemma establishes that 
messages may also be viewed as reflecting the inclusion of observable and verifiable 
product attributes (e.g., m = “contains silk” for s = Shampoo), in which case  ≠ mx  
implies that the persuader paid some weakly positive cost to change an objective product 24 
attribute and sophisticated individuals take messages at face value (as in the “persuasion 
games” of Milgrom and Roberts 1986b).
 19  
 
Bayesians 
To simplify the remaining analysis and get clear results, we make several 
additional assumptions.  First, we assume that public information is uninformative in s = 
0 in the sense that 
  E[q | r,s = 0]= E[q | s = 0] (3.6) 
for all r.   Second, we assume that the expected quality conditional on each situation 
equals zero:  
  = [|] 0 Eq s  (3.7) 
These two additional assumptions are not important for our qualitative results and serve 
to simplify the algebra. 
Together with the uninformative persuasion assumption, these assumptions imply 
that the Bayesian expectation of quality in situation s = 0 satisfies: 
  = == = [|,, 0 ] [| 0 ] 0 Eq rms Eq s  (3.8)   
for all r and m. 
                                                 
19 A somewhat subtle question is how coarse thinkers should compute  ˆ p(s | r,m) when messages are 
verifiable.  However, given categorization rule (2.3) together with update rule (2.6), it does not matter 
whether they calculate  ˆ p(s |r,m) =
ˆ p(r,m | s)p(s)
ˆ p(r,m | s')p(s')
s'∈{0,1,2} ∑
 or 




, where  ˆ p(r,m| s) is defined as in footnote 9. 25 
Under these assumptions, we first characterize the persuader’s optimal (i.e., 
equilibrium) strategy when the audience consists of Bayesians:  
Proposition 1 (Bayesian baseline):  Suppose individuals are Bayesians.  Then an 
optimal strategy of the persuader in situation s = 0 is to always report m = x and to never 
pay the cost to send some other message ≠ mx .  If  > 0 c , this strategy is unique. 
 
Proof:  Recall that all messages are uninformative in situation s = 0.  As a result, fixing r, 
the persuader receives payoff E[q | r,m,s = 0]= 0 (from (3.8)) if he sends  = mx and 
receives payoff E[q | r,m,s = 0]− c = −c if he sends  ≠ mx .  Clearly,  ≥− 0 c so an 
optimal strategy of the persuader is to always report  = mx .  Since this inequality is strict 
whenever  > 0 c , this strategy is uniquely optimal whenever  > 0 c . ■ 
According to Proposition 1, persuaders never fabricate uninformative messages 
(or change uninformative product attributes) for Bayesians when the cost of doing so is 
positive.  Because private signals in situation s = 0 are assumed to be uninformative 
about quality, Bayesians do not update their beliefs from messages sent by the persuader.  
Thus the persuader receives no benefit from fabricating such messages and is unwilling 
to pay a positive cost to do so. 
 
Coarse thinkers 
  We now examine the persuader’s optimal strategy when the audience consists of 
coarse thinkers.  In the next two propositions, we characterize the persuader’s optimal 
strategy conditional on public information.  Fix public information r and, without loss of 
generality, assume that  = 1 () Cr C (recall from before that C(r) ≡ C(r,∅)).   First, 26 
consider the case where messages are not pivotal given r.  Also, without loss of 
generality, suppose that private signal x = a is more favorable than private signal x = b in 
s = 1 in the following sense: 
  E[q | r,a,s =1] ≥ E[q |r,b,s =1] (3.9) 
We have the following proposition: 
Proposition 2 (Transference): Suppose that individuals are coarse thinkers, that 
messages are not pivotal given public information r, and that condition (3.9) holds.   Then 
an optimal strategy of the persuader in situation s = 0 may involve the creation of a 
message.  Specifically, so long as  
  () <= − = = = 1 [|,, 1 ] [|,, 1 ] ( 1 | ) * cE q r a s E q r b s p s C c  (3.10)   
any optimal strategy of the persuader dictates reporting m=a whenever x = b . 
 
Proof:
 Fix the public information r and recall that neither message is assumed to be 
pivotal.  If the persuader reports  = = mxb   to a coarse thinker, his payoff is 
== = =
1
1 [|,, 0 ] [|,, 1 ]( 1 | )
C E qrb s E qrb s p s C .  If he replaces x = b with m = a, his payoff 
is  =− = = = −
1
1 [|,, 0 ] [|,, 1 ]( 1 | )
C E q ras c Eq ras ps C c.  Subtracting the first payoff from 
the second, the persuader optimally replaces x = b with m = a if this difference is positive 
or, equivalently, if  * cc < . ■ 
 
  Condition (3.10) yields a corollary: 
Corollary 1:  Suppose the conditions of Proposition 2 hold and let  * c  be defined as 
above.  Then,  * c  is weakly increasing in (i) the probability of situation s = 1 in category 27 











 and (ii) the magnitude of reaction in the co-
categorized situation,  = −= [|,, 1 ] [|,, 1 ] Eq ras Eq rbs . 
Proof:  From (3.10),  () == − = = 1 *[ | , , 1 ] [ | , , 1 ] ( 1 | ) cE q r a s E q r b s p sC .  This expression 
is increasing in (i)  = 1 (1 | ) p sC  since  = ≥= [|,, 1 ] [|,, 1 ] Eq ras Eq rbs  by (3.9) and (ii) in 
=− = [|,, 1 ] [|,, 1 ] Eq ras Eq rbs  since  = ≥ 1 (1 | ) 0 ps C . ■ 
 
Proposition 2 illustrates that persuaders may pay a cost to alter messages for 
coarse thinkers even when the message they send cannot be pivotal.  Their decision 
depends on whether the gap (in terms of the improved assessment of quality) between the 
best possible message (or attribute) and the private signal (or original attribute) is large 
enough to offset the cost of persuasion.  This provides a way of thinking about why 
Culver replaced x = “no silk” with m = “silk” by putting “silk in the bottle.”   
  Corollary 1 highlights the fact that, with two co-categorized situations, a 
persuader is more likely to manufacture a message in situation s = 0 if it has a lower 
probability within its category. Since the benefit for manufacturing messages is the 
transference of the informational content from other situations in a category to the current 
one, a higher probability of these other situations increases transference and this benefit.   
This point may shed light on what advertisers refer to as consumer involvement, a 
notion closely related to but not identical to that of “stakes.”  A high involvement product 
occupies a huge probability space in its category (p(s = 0) is high), so the transference 
from other situations is small, and hence so is the benefit of non-informative advertising.  
Our model predicts, as the marketing research recommends, that advertising in these 
instances should be informative (Sutherland and Sylvester 2000).  In contrast, low 28 
involvement products are mixed up in consumers’ minds with many similar situations 
and hence there is greater scope for persuasion, exactly as the marketing literature 
suggests.  Alberto Culver Shampoo and Schwarzenegger’s defense of free trade are both 
consistent with this point.  Voting may be another low involvement activity, which 
encourages non-informative advertising.  Our point is not that people are incapable of 
rational high involvement thinking, but rather that in many instances they do not engage 
in such thinking, perhaps because it is not worth it.  It is precisely in those instances of 
coarse thinking that persuasion pays. 
We now consider the case where categorization depends on the exact message the 
persuader sends, i.e., one message is pivotal.  To limit the number of cases, suppose that 
message m = a is pivotal in changing categorization from C1to C2 and that the persuader 
weakly “prefers” sending pivotal message m = a over non-pivotal message m = b: 
  == ≥ == 21 [|,, 2 ]( 2 | ) [|,, 1 ]( 1 | ) Eq ras ps C Eq rbs ps C  (3.11) 
Since message m = a is pivotal, it does not matter whether (3.9) still holds. 
We then have:            
Proposition 3 (Framing): Suppose individuals are coarse thinkers, that message m = a is 
pivotal given public information r, and that condition (3.11) holds.  Then an optimal 
strategy of the persuader in situation s = 0 may involve the creation of a message.   
Specifically, so long as  
  () <= = − = = 21 [|,, 2 ]( 2 | ) [|,, 1 ]( 1 | ) c Eqras ps C Eq rbs ps C  (3.12)   
any optimal strategy of the persuader dictates reporting m=a whenever x = b.
  29 
Proof:
20 Fix some piece of public information r and recall the assumption that m = a is 
pivotal given this information.  If the persuader reports  = = mxb  to a coarse thinker, his 
payoff is  == = =
1
1 [|,, 0 ] [|,, 1 ]( 1 | )
C E qrb s E qrb s p s C .  If he replaces x = b with m = a, 
his payoff is  =− = = = −
2
2 [|,, 0 ] [|,, 2 ]( 2 | )
C E q ras c Eq ras ps C c.  Subtracting the first 
payoff from the second, the persuader optimally replaces x = b with m = a when this 
difference is positive or, equivalently, when condition (3.12) holds. ■ 
 
Corollary 2: Suppose the conditions of Proposition 3 hold and that any message the 
persuader sends is uninformative about quality within each categorization given the 
public information:  = == [|,, 0 ] [|, 0 ]
ii CC Eq r m s Eq r s  for all  ∈{1, 2} i .  So long as (3.12) 
still holds, any optimal strategy of the persuader dictates replacing x = b with m = a: the 
optimal strategy of the persuader dictates paying a positive cost to send a message that is 
uninformative about quality within each categorization in order to desirably categorize 
situation s = 0 in light of public information r. 
  Examples from the introduction illustrate Corollary 2.  With its ad “Be Bullish,” 
Merrill Lynch frames itself as provider of opportunities during the internet bubble, 
without conveying any useful information.     With its ad, “We try harder,” Avis frames 
itself as an underdog, and encourages car renters to interpret its lagging status in this 
favorable light, again without conveying any useful information.  
 
                                                 
20 The conditions of Proposition 3 imply that the persuader would never wish to pay a cost to send the non-
pivotal message m = b.  This result hinges on the assumption (3.11).  With the alternative (and equally 
reasonable) assumption that the inequality in (3.11) is reversed, the persuader would pay a sufficiently low 
cost to replace x = a (and avoid sending the pivotal message m = a) with non-pivotal message m = b. 30 
Corollary 3 (Withholding Good Messages): Suppose the conditions of Proposition 3 
hold and that m = b is a favorable message within each categorization given the public 
information:  => = [|,, 0 ] [|,, 0 ]  
ii CC Eq r b s Eq r a s for all  ∈{1, 2} i .  So long as (3.12) still 
holds, any optimal strategy of the persuader dictates replacing private signal x = b with 
message m = a:  the optimal strategy of the persuader may dictate paying a positive cost 
to send a message that is universally less favorable in order to avoid undesirably 
categorizing situation s = 0 in light of public information r. 
 
  Corollary 3 presents a more subtle prediction of the model, which we return to in 
Section 5 where we study mutual fund advertising.  It says that firms avoid presenting 
good news when such news create unattractive frames.  In Section 5, we show that 
mutual funds avoid presenting favorable information about their relative returns during 
periods of falling stock prices, perhaps because the mere mention of returns invites co-
categorization of investments as grabbing opportunities, a frame that is not compelling 
during declining markets.  
  The previous two propositions characterize the persuader’s optimal strategy 
conditional on public information.  It is also interesting to examine the persuader’s full 
strategy to see how it might depend on the public information.  From Proposition 1, we 
know that the persuader’s optimal strategy is independent of public information when the 
audience consists of Bayesians.  The same is not necessarily true when the audience 
consists of coarse thinkers:  
 31 
Proposition 4. Suppose individuals are coarse thinkers.  Then an optimal strategy of the 
persuader in situation s = 0 may depend on public information.  That is, there may exist 
some x such that the persuader reports  ≠ mx  when r = u but reports  = mx when  = rd . 
Proof (by example):  Example A.  Suppose  = = 1 () () Cu Cd C and message m = a is 
pivotal given each piece of public information; that is,  = = 2 (,) (,) Cua Cda C.  Further, 
suppose  
  == > == 21 [|,, 2 ]( 2 | ) [|,, 1 ]( 1 | ) Eq uas ps C Eq ubs ps C  
 and  
  ==> == 12 [|,, 1 ]( 1 | ) [|,, 2 ]( 2 | ) Eq dbs ps C Eq das ps C  
    These two inequalities imply that  = >=
21 [|,, 0 ] [|,, 0 ]
CC E quas E qubs  and   
=> =
12 [|,, 0 ] [|,, 0 ]
CC Eq d b s Eq d a s .  So long as 
{ } <= − = = − =
21 12 m i n [|,, 0 ] [|,, 0 ] , [|,, 0 ] [|,, 0 ]
CC CC cE q u a s E q u b s E q d b s E q d a s
 
the persuader’s optimal strategy dictates replacing x = b with m = a when r = u and 
replacing x = a with m = b when r = d. 
Example B.  Suppose  = 1 () Cu C,  = 2 () Cd C, and messages are not pivotal given either 
possible piece of public information.  Further suppose that 
=> = [|,, 1 ] [|,, 1 ] Eq uas Eq ubs  and  = >= [ | , , 2] [ | , , 2] Eq dbs Eq das .  These two 
inequalities imply that E
C1[q |u,a,s = 0]> E
C1[q |u,b,s = 0] and   
E
C2[q | d,b,s = 0]> E
C2[q |d,a,s = 0].  So long as 
c < min E
C1[q |u,a,s = 0]− E
C1[q |u,b,s = 0],E
C2[q |d,b,s = 0]− E
C2[q |d,a,s = 0] { }
 32 
the persuader’s optimal strategy dictates replacing x = b with m = a when r = u and 
replacing x = a with m = b when r = d.  ■ 
We supply two examples in the proof of Proposition 4 (though only one is 
necessary).  Merrill Lynch’s advertising campaigns over the course of the internet bubble 
illustrate both examples, but also show how specific advertisements take advantage of 
both framing and transference.  In the first example, there is always a pivotal message, 
which allows the persuader to frame s = 0 differently depending on the information he 
wishes to frame.  Merrill Lynch advertises with “be bullish” to frame itself as a provider 
of opportunities when market returns have been high, but with “a tradition of trust” to 
frame itself as a provider of services when market returns have been low.  
   The second example shows that the persuader may wish to send different, non-
pivotal, messages depending on how s = 0 is categorized given the public information.  
Having framed public information about market returns, Merrill Lynch advertises its 
financial analysts upon framing itself as a provider of opportunities, but its financial 
consultants or advisors upon framing itself as a provider of services.  These features of 
Merrill Lynch’s ads tap into, rather than alter, the prevailing mental model, and take 
advantage of transference. 
 
4.  Product Branding  
A major challenge for the fields of Industrial Organization and Marketing is to 
understand product branding.  Consumers buy many branded products, often repeatedly, 
at higher prices than identical or nearly identical “generic” products (Tirole 1988).   
According to Peter and Olson (2005, p. 97), 71% of cigarette buyers, 65% of mayonnaise 33 
buyers, 61% of toothpaste buyers, and 53% of bath soap buyers are loyal to their brands 
(i.e., claim in a survey of 2000 respondents to mostly buy the same brand).  Although 
some brands are physically different from generic products, others, such as Clorox 
bleach, are identical.  In this section, we show how firms may be able to differentiate 
their products and create brands through uninformative advertising.   
To fix ideas, consider the case of California Burgundy.  Burgundy is a French 
region that produces high quality and expensive wines from the pinot noir grape.   
California also produces expensive wines from the pinot noir grape.  In California, they 
are called pinot noir, not burgundy.  About 40 years ago, California wine producers 
started making inexpensive red wines called California Burgundy.  These wines contain 
no pinot noir grape, only cheaper varietals.   Even so, it appears that merchants tend to 
charge more for a 5-liter package of Peter Vella California Burgundy than for the same 
sized package of Peter Vella Delicious Red.  In May 2007, out of the 48 stores listed on 
winesearcher.com as selling both wines, 27 charge more, 20 charge the same amount, and 
2 charge less for California Burgundy.  The average “premium” on California Burgundy 
is 73 cents ($12.60 for California Burgundy as opposed to $11.87 for Delicious Red).  As 
a brand, California Burgundy appears to command a price premium even though its 
physical characteristics have nothing to do with burgundy wine (it is still possible, 
however, that the brand is superior for some other reason we cannot verify).    
Our model provides a way to understand why California Burgundy sells for more 
than Delicious Red.  Consider a consumer facing one of two similar situations:  buying a 
bottle of American red wine (s = US) and buying a bottle of French red wine (s = FR).  
American bottles are all initially labeled Table (x = Table) but French bottles are either 34 
initially labeled Table or Burgundy (x = Burgundy).  We assume that neither label is 
informative in evaluating the quality of American wine, but that the label Burgundy is a 
positive signal of quality for French wine.  Specifically
21 
 
== > > = =
== = = = =
[| , ] 0 [| , ]
[| , ] 0 [| , ]
E q x Burgundy s FR E q x Table s FR
E q x Burgundy s US E q x Table s US
 (4.1) 
  The audience is populated by measure one of consumers.  Fraction β  of 
consumers are coarse thinkers who co-categorize buying a bottle of American wine with 
buying a bottle of French wine no matter how the bottle is labeled:  for all m, 
=≡ (){ , } Cm U SF R C .
22  Fraction  β − 1  are Bayesians who differentiate the two 
situations.  From (4.1) it follows that for coarse thinkers: 
  == > > = = [| , ] 0 [| , ]
CC E q m Burgundy s US E q m Table s US  (4.2) 
and for Bayesians: 
  == = = = [| , ] [| , ] . E q m Burgundy s US E q m Table s US  (4.3) 
A monopolist wine producer in the United States sells two homogeneous (or 
perfectly substitutable) wines,  =1 w  and  = 2 w . The producer can at zero cost label the 
wines “Table” or pay a fixed advertising cost  ≥ 0 c to label one or both wines 
“Burgundy”.
23  For simplicity, the marginal cost of production is set to equal 0. 
  A consumer buys at most one bottle of wine.  Decision utility from purchasing a 
bottle of wine w is given by: 
                                                 
21 We ignore the possibility of public information in this section.   
22 To simplify matters, we only allow for situation s = US to be co-categorized with one other situation, s = 
FR, in this section.  In other words, we abstract away from the possibility that the coarse thinker may group 
situation “buying a bottle of American red wine” with another distinct situation (e.g., “buying a bottle of 
Italian red wine”) depending on the message sent by the producer.   
23 If it seems troubling to assume that it is costly to label wine “Burgundy”, note that we allow c = 0.  35 
  = +− () , ww Uw u q p  (4.4) 
where  w q  denotes the quality and  w p  the price of wine w and u > 0 is some constant. 
To limit the number of cases considered, assume that β <− [| , ]
C u E q Table US .
24  Utility 
from not buying wine is assumed to equal 0. Consumers maximize their expected 
(decision) utility.    
Consider a game with two periods.  In the first period, the monopolist 
simultaneously decides how to label and price its wines.
25  In the second, consumers 
observe the label and price of each wine and decide which wine (if any) to buy.   
An equilibrium in this context is defined to be a tuple of strategies satisfying: (i) 
the producer’s choice of labels and prices (his strategy) maximizes profits given 
consumers’ strategies and (ii) for each set of labels and prices each consumer’s strategy 
dictates making a purchase decision that maximizes expected utility. 
We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria in which the firm sells both wines 
to a positive fraction of the population on the equilibrium path.  Defining 
  ( ) β ≡+ [| , ]
C cu E q B u r gundy US  (4.5) 
we have the following results:  
Proposition 5:  Suppose all individuals are Bayesians (β = 0) and a monopolist wine 
producer sells two homogeneous wines in the U.S.  Then there exists an equilibrium such 
that the producer does not label either wine Burgundy and charges the same price u  for 
each of its wines.  When  > 0 c , any equilibrium has this property. 
                                                 
24 This eliminates the possibility that the monopolist could find it optimal to label both wines Table and 
charge u + E
C[q |,Table,US]< u  (recall that E
C[q |,Table,US]< 0 ) for each wine (selling to both 
Bayesians and coarse thinkers).   
25 We assume that buyers do not take price to be a potential signal of quality in either s = US or s = FR. 36 
Proof:  In Appendix 1. 
Proposition 6:  Suppose fraction  β < < 01  of consumers are coarse thinkers who co-
categorize buying U.S and French wine and there is a monopolist wine producer selling 
two homogeneous wines in the U.S.  If  < cc , product differentiation through 
uninformative advertising emerges:  in any equilibrium, the producer replaces x = Table 
with  m = Burgundy for exactly one of its wines and charges 
+= = > [| , ]
C u E q m Burgundy s US u  for that wine while charging u for the other.  The 
higher priced wine is sold to the coarse thinkers.  If  > cc , then in any equilibrium the 
producer labels each wine m = x = Table and charges u for each wine.  In any such 
equilibrium, coarse thinkers do not buy either wine.  
Proof:  In Appendix 1.  
  Proposition 6 shows how product branding emerges in equilibrium for certain 
parameter values.  In such an equilibrium, the branded good is sold for a higher price than 
the generic good.  The reason that this is possible is that the coarse thinking audience 
(incorrectly) believes the branded good is superior because it is associated with an 
attribute that contains decision-relevant information in a co-categorized situation. This 
rendition of branding seems broadly consistent with the standard discussions in the 
marketing literature (Sutherland and Sylvester 2000; Peter and Olson 2005).    
 
5.  Mutual Funds 
The mutual fund industry presents a major challenge to financial economics.  It is 
enormous, supervising around $7 trillion of investor assets.  It includes thousands of 
competitors, who nonetheless charge high fees and remain highly profitable.   Perhaps 37 
most strikingly, it appears to provide no economic value to investors, with virtually all 
mutual funds underperforming by a significant margin passive investment strategies 
offered by low-fee index funds (Swensen 2005).  How can an industry be so successful 
while adding so little value and charging so much?  Perhaps part of the answer is 
successful persuasion.  Below we present a simple model of advertising to coarse-
thinking mutual fund investors, and offer some evidence that it can help explain.   
 
A Simple Model  
 Suppose that coarse thinking individuals do not sufficiently differentiate between 
choosing a mutual fund and selecting other professional advisors, such as doctors or 
lawyers, or grabbing great opportunities, such as buying stocks or finding jobs on tips.  
Individuals face one of three similar situations: selecting a mutual fund (s = MF), 
selecting a professional service (s = PS), and grabbing an opportunity (s = GO). 
The data an individual sees are as follows.  First, he observes publicly available 
data about general past performance ∈{, } ru d , where r = u stands for good past 
performance and r = d stands for bad past performance.  For a mutual fund, this could be 
the past market return.  For another professional service, this could be the history of 
success of a particular surgery or type of lawsuit.  For grabbing an opportunity, this could 
be his own or his friends’ experience with chasing tips.  
Second, he may receive a more specific hard message from a persuader about past 
performance  ∈{,} pp p ma b , where mp = ap stands for good past performance and mp =bp 
stands for bad past performance.  For a mutual fund, this could be some measure of its 
past relative or absolute return.  For another professional service, this could be the history 38 
of success of a particular doctor or lawyer.  For grabbing an opportunity, this could be a 
measure of past success, such as return, as well.      
We depart from the formal model presented earlier in one way.  We assume that 
the mutual fund cannot fabricate hard information about past performance.  In other 
words, it cannot send  ≠ pp mx .  On the other hand, the mutual fund can at zero cost 
choose not to report information about past returns and send message mp =∅ no matter 
the realization of  p x .  This departure does not introduce any new conceptual issues.  
To apply the analysis of previous sections we make five assumptions.  First, we 
expand the set of possible private signals to include the empty message and assume that it 
is in general uninformative about quality:
26 
Assumption 1:  E[q |r,xp = ∅,s]= E[q |r,s] for all r and s  (5.1) 
Second, we assume that the availability of past performance data is associated 
with grabbing opportunities.  Specifically, we assume that the joint distribution p is such 
that selecting a mutual fund is co-categorized with grabbing an opportunity if and only if 
the fund reports a non-null message about its past performance.
27  Formally,  
Assumption 2:  C(r,mp) =
CGrabOpp ≡ {MF,GO} if mp ≠ ∅





for all r. 
                                                 
26 A realistic assumption is that mutual funds always have access to verifiable past performance data (so 
p(∅ | s = MF) = 0 ).  However, we do not need to make any explicit assumptions on 
p(xp | s = MF)for the following analysis to hold. 
27 An implicit assumption here is that, unlike mutual funds, other professional services and opportunities 
sometimes do not have access to past performance data (or such data is unverifiable) and access is 
uncorrelated with quality.  39 
Third, we assume that all data on past performance are uninformative in 
evaluating the quality of a mutual fund (Carhart 1997; Chevalier and Ellison 1997; Sirri 
and Tufano 1998; Swensen 2005)
28:  
Assumption 3:  E[q |r,xp,s = MF]= 0 for all (r,xp) (5.3) 
Assumption 3 implies that it is also the case that  
  E[q |r,mp,s = MF]= 0 for all (r,mp) (5.4) 
Fourth, we assume that in evaluating other professional services or opportunities 
good past performance data constitute good news about quality: 
Assumption 4:  
E[q |u,xp,s'] ≥ E[q |d,xp,s']     for all xp
E[q |r,ap,s'] ≥ E[q |r,bp,s'] for all r
 (5.5)   
for each  ∈ '{ , } sP S G O . 
Finally, we assume that past aggregate performance data are “sufficiently” more 
informative relative to individual performance data in evaluating the quality of 




== > = =
== < = =
[|, , ]( | ) [|, ]( | )
[|, , ]( | ) [|, ]( | )
p GrabOpp ProServ
p GrabOpp ProServ
E q u b sG O p sG O C E q u sP S p sP S C
E q d a sG O p sG O C E q d sP S p sP S C
 (5.6) 
  The above assumptions yield the following proposition: 
                                                 
28 We are carrying over assumption (3.9) from the earlier sections that, for all s, E[q | s]= 0   
29 The conditions of Assumption 5 guarantee, respectively, that the mutual fund always reports   
performance when aggregate returns have been high and never reports it when aggregate returns have been 
low.  An example might clarify the link between the intuition and the mathematical conditions of 
Assumption 5.  The mathematical conditions would be met, for instance, if past aggregate performance data 
are uninformative in selecting another professional service but are “more informative” than even individual 
performance data in grabbing an opportunity in the sense that E[q |u,bp,s = GO]> 0 and 
E[q|d,ap,s = GO]< 0. 40 
Proposition 7:  Suppose individuals are coarse thinkers and Assumptions 1- 5 hold.   
When aggregate returns have been high (r = u), the optimal strategy of the mutual fund 
dictates always reporting message  = pp mx  about past performance; i.e., always reporting 
hard information about past returns.  When aggregate returns have been low (r = d), the 
optimal strategy of the mutual fund dictates always reporting message mp =∅ about past 
performance; i.e., never reporting hard information about past returns. 
Proof: Fixing r  and  p x , the persuader receives payoff 
== [|, , ]( | ) p GrabOpp E q r xsG O p sG O C if he reports  = pp mx  (by Assumptions 2 and 3) and 
receives payoff  == [|, ]( | ) ProServ E q r s PS p s PS C if he reports mp = ∅(by Assumptions 1, 
2, and 3).  By Assumptions 4 and 5, the former payoff is strictly higher than the latter 
whenever  r = u, and strictly lower whenever r = d.  Consequentially, any optimal 
strategy of the persuader dictates always reporting  = pp mx  when r = u and always 
reporting mp =∅ when r = d.  Uniqueness is immediate. ■ 
 
Proposition 7 yields two implications.  First, since past performance data are 
informative for evaluating the quality of opportunities, a mutual fund will advertise with 
data about its past performance when aggregate returns have been high to co-categorize 
selecting the fund with grabbing such opportunities and thereby to maximize the reaction 
to the good aggregate returns.  Second, to minimize the reaction to bad aggregate returns, 
a mutual fund will not report even universally favorable information about past returns 
when aggregate returns have been low, so as to avoid co-categorizing selecting the fund 
with grabbing such opportunities.  41 
  Before turning to the evidence, three comments about these implications are in 
order.  First, the prediction that mutual funds advertise their own performance in rising 
but not in falling markets is difficult to reconcile with any plausible theory of rational 
persuasion.  One could imagine a rational signal-extraction theory in which own past 
performance is informative about managerial ability in rising, but not in falling, markets.  
However, this does not strike us as plausible (in fact, the reverse seems more plausible).  
Moreover, this rational signal-extraction theory is difficult to reconcile with other facts 
about mutual fund advertising, such as omission of data about fees.    
Second, the model does not deal with one additional important fact about mutual 
fund advertising, namely that it rarely includes data on management fees (Cronqvist 
2005), data which is arguably crucial to assessing future returns. An extension of our 
model, which takes advantage of the fact that consumers often do not know fees for other 
professional services, such as doctors, might account for this finding.  Such an extension 
was explored in the previous draft of this paper.     
Third, another extension of the model might deal with the closely related question 
of which products to advertise.   Specifically, firms should advertise products that co-
categorize selecting a mutual fund with grabbing opportunities after returns have been 
high, and products that co-categorize selecting the fund with choosing other professional 
services after returns have been low.  Mullainathan and Shleifer (2006) present evidence 
that the advertising of growth funds is highly pro-cyclical.  Below, however, we focus on 




We put together a data set of all financial advertisements from two magazines: 
Business Week and Money.  Business Week is a weekly business newsmagazine.  We 
examine all issues from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2003.  Money is monthly and 
more specifically directed at individual investors.  We examine all the issues from 
January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2003.  (The one year difference in coverage is due to 
hard copy availability in Harvard libraries.)  We copy and date all financial 
advertisements in every issue, both to count them and to examine their content.  We 
aggregate the information on both the number and the content of ads into quarterly series.  
In particular, we keep track of who the advertiser is, whether it is a mutual fund and, if 
so, of what kind, and whether the ads include information on the fund’s own past returns.  
Since we are interested in the persuasion of investors, we eliminate from the database 
business to business ads (principally investment banking ads, or other ads explicitly 
directed at companies).  Our total sample includes 1469 ads from Business Week and 
4971 ads from Money.  
Figure 2 shows, for Business Week and Money separately, the share of stock 
mutual fund ads containing information on own past returns (absolute or relative) in all 
stock mutual fund ads over the sample period.  It also shows, for the same period, the 
rolling one quarter lagged return on the S&P 500 index, the most common indicator of 
broad market returns.   As Figure 2 shows, on average only about 60 percent of the stock 
mutual fund ads present any data on own past returns, and the correlation between the 
share of ads including these returns and the past market return is over .7 for both Money 43 
and Business Week.
30   Indeed, Figure 2 makes clear that, after the market crash, past 
returns data disappear from advertisements.   This finding is broadly consistent with the 
predictions of our model, namely that the inclusion of past returns data is used to frame 
mutual fund investing as grabbing an opportunity rather than as hiring advice.  
One might object that this evidence is best explained by a simpler theory that 
funds only like to report good news, and the news is bad in down markets.  If this were 
correct, then stock funds with good relative return news to report should report them in 
down markets as well, since they can always do so.  Corollary 3 predicts, in contrast, that 
even good news about relative returns should not be reported to avoid the grabbing 
opportunities categorization.  Is this prediction borne out by the data?  Do companies 
really avoid advertising good relative returns in down markets, as our model predicts?   
Figure 3 addresses this hypothesis.  It shows the relevant data for T. Rowe Price, a 
mutual fund complex that is the most frequent advertiser in our sample.   We supplement 
our advertising data with a sample of T. Rowe Price stock mutual funds with assets over 
$300 million at the beginning of the sample period, so we can compute the number of 
large T. Rowe Price stock mutual funds that outperform the market.  Figure 3 shows that 
T. Rowe Price places a lot of ads during this period, and that it has many funds 
outperforming S&P 500 after 1999.  If anything, the number of stock funds with good 
relative performance rises sharply during 2001-2002.  Nonetheless, both the number of 
stock mutual fund ads, and the number of such ads reporting returns, falls to near zero 
after the market declines.  Even though T. Rowe Price has many funds with positive 
relative performance, it chooses not to advertise them.  This finding is, again, broadly 
                                                 
30 These correlations fall by about .2, but remain highly statistically significant, if we detrend all series 
using linear time trends. 44 
consistent with our model, in which advertising returns primes the “opportunities” frame, 
which is unattractive to investors in down markets.     
 
6.  Conclusion 
  This paper has supplied a formal model of associative thinking reflecting ideas 
about inference and persuasion from such diverse fields as linguistics, psychology, 
politics, marketing, and advertising.  The main idea is that individuals “think coarsely”: 
they group situations into categories, and apply the same model of inference to all 
situations within a category.  Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take 
advantage of: (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a 
given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not, and 
(ii) framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals’ choice of 
category.  The model includes full Bayesian rationality as a limiting case, in which each 
situation is evaluated as if in its own category. 
  The model sheds light on several phenomena.  It explains how “soft” messages 
with little informational content can be persuasive, especially in low involvement 
situations such as choosing inexpensive goods or evaluating political candidates.  It helps 
dissect the content of successful advertisements.  It illuminates product branding.   And it 
helps account for some features of mutual fund advertising, such as the pro-cyclical 
inclusion of returns, which are hard to rationalize in any conventional model of 
informative communication. 
  Our paper is just a first step in the analysis of uninformative persuasion.   
Although we have allowed for category choice, we have not allowed for fluid categories, 45 
which can accommodate much more creativity on the part of the persuader (Lakoff 
1987).  We have also focused on associative thinking rather than on associative feeling; 
there are no automatic quick judgments in our model.  In persuasion, such feelings are 




Appendix 1:  Proofs  
Proof of Lemma: 
First I will show that part (i) holds so long as  
  ˆ σ(m |r,x,s') =
1 if m = x






  ˆ p(x |r,m,s') =
1 if x = m





for  s'∈ 1,2 {} .  Note that conditions (A1.1) and (A1.2) hold whether the audience is 
sophisticated or takes messages at face value. 
  To establish part (i), I need to show that  
  C(r,m) = argmax
C∈{C1,C2 }
ˆ p(s ∈C |r,m) (A1.3) 




ˆ p(s ∈C |r,m) ⇔
ˆ p(s ∈C1 |r,m) ≥ ˆ p(s ∈C2 |r,m) ⇔
ˆ p(s =1|r,m) ≥ ˆ p(s = 2|r,m) ⇔
ˆ p(r,m | s =1)p(s =1)
ˆ p(r,m | s')p(s')
s' ∑
≥
ˆ p(r,m | s = 2)p(s = 2)
ˆ p(r,m | s')p(s')
s' ∑
⇔
ˆ p(r,m | s =1)p(s =1) ≥ ˆ p(r,m | s = 2)p(s = 2) ⇔
p(r,m | s =1)p(s =1) ≥ p(r,m | s = 2)p(s = 2)
 (A1.4) 
Note that this last condition is independent of  ˆ σ(m |r,x,s = 0) and 
ˆ p(x | r,m,s = 0). 47 
Now, to prove parts (ii) and (iii) of the lemma it is sufficient to show that 
E[q | r,m,s = 0]and  E
C(r,m)[q |r,m,s = 0] do not depend on  ˆ σ(m |r,x,s = 0) and 
ˆ p(x | r,m,s = 0). 
 First  consider  E[q | r,m,s = 0]: 
 
E[q |r,m,s = 0] = E[q |r,x',s = 0]ˆ p(x'|r,m,s = 0)
x'∈{a,b} ∑
= E[q |r,s = 0]ˆ p(x'|r,m,s = 0)
x'∈{a,b} ∑
= E[q |r,s = 0]
 (A1.5) 
for any  ˆ σ(m |r,x,s = 0) and  ˆ p(x | r,m,s = 0), where the second equality follows from 
the uninformative persuasion assumption.  Equation (A1.5) establishes the lemma for the 
case where the audience consists of Bayesians. 
 Now  consider  E
C(r,m)[q |r,m,s = 0].  Fixing C(r,m) = Ci: 
 
E
Ci[q |r,m,s = 0] = E[q |r,m,s = 0]p(s = 0|Ci)+ E[q |r,m,s = i]p(s = i |Ci)







⎥ p(s = i |Ci)
= E[q |r,s = 0]p(s = 0|Ci)+ E[q |r,x = m,s = i]p(s = i |Ci)
 (A1.6) 






Proof of Propositions 5 and 6:   
First, note that a necessary and sufficient condition for any given strategy of a 
consumer (Bayesian or coarse) to be a best response to the producer’s strategy is that it 
specifies buying wine  =≠ wi j with positive probability for prices  12 (, ) p p  and labels 
12 (,) mm only if  
 
u + qi
e − pi ≥ u + qj
e − pj IC
u + qi
e − pi ≥ 0I R
 (A1.7) 
 
and places positive probability on not buying either wine only if  
  0 ≥ max
k∈{1,2} u + qk
e − pk { } (A1.8) 
 
where  qi
e = E[q| mi,US] if the consumer is a Bayesian and qi
e = E
C[q | mi,US] if the 
consumer is a coarse thinker. 
The monopolist maximizes its profit, 
∏=p1D1(p1, p2,δ)+ p2D2(p1, p2,δ)−δ1c −δ2c, given consumers’ strategies, where 
∈(0,1) i D  denotes the total demand for wine w = i given consumers’ strategies and δi  is 
an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if and only if the monopolist labels wine w 
= i “Burgundy”.    
  Consider a possible equilibrium where both wines are labeled “Table”.  In any 
such equilibrium, it must be the case that  = ≡ 12 p pp  since we confine attention to 
equilibria in which both wines are sold with positive probability on the equilibrium path 
and wine w = i would face zero demand due to consumers’ incentive compatibility (IC) 
constraints if  > ij p p .  Also, in any such equilibrium,  = p u .  To see this, suppose first 49 
that  > p u .  Then both wines would face zero demand by consumers’ IR constraints and 
the producer would want to deviate and charge  = p u , thereby selling to the Bayesians 
and making positive profit. The producer would also not want to set 
+< < [| , ]
C u E q Table US p u  or  <+ [| , ]
C p u E q Table US  because it would wish to 
deviate by setting  = p u  and  =+ [| , ]
C p uEq T a b l e U S  respectively.  It is thus left to 
check that the producer also would not wish to set  =+ [| , ]
C p uEq T a b l e U S  and sell to 
both Bayesians and coarse thinkers. The producer’s payoff is   + [| , ]
C u E q Table US  if it 
sets  =+ [| , ]
C p uEq T a b l e U S  whereas it is  β − (1 )u  if it sets  = p u .  The second payoff 
is greater than the first since β <− [| , ]
C u E q Table US  by assumption.   
We have established that in any equilibrium where both wines are labeled “Table” 
the producer charges  = p u  for each wine (selling only to Bayesians) and earns 
(1− β)u ≡∏ (NoDiff ). (*) 
Now consider a possible equilibrium where the producer labels only one wine 
(say w = 2) “Burgundy”.  In any such equilibrium, the producer clearly charges  = 1 p u  
and  =+ 2 [| , ]
C p uEq B u r gundy US  since these are the highest prices it can charge while 
still satisfying consumers’ IR constraints.  In such an equilibrium, Bayesians buy w = 1 
since  =< =+ 12 [| , ]
C p upuE q B u r gundy US  and coarse thinkers buy w = 2 since 
+− = > + − = 21 [| , ] 0 [| , ] [| , ]
CC C uEq B u r gundy US p u E q Table US p E q Table US .  The 
payoff to the producer in such an equilibrium is 
(1− β)u + β(u + E
C[q | Burgundy,US])− c = βE




  Thus, we have established that in any equilibrium where wine w = 2 is labeled 
“Burgundy” the producer charges  = 1 p u  for wine w = 1 (selling only to Bayesians), 
charges  =+ 2 [| , ]
C p uEq B u r gundy US  for wine w = 2  (selling only to coarse thinkers), 
and earns ∏(Diff ). (**) 
By similar logic, the producer earns at most 
max u,β u + E
C[q| Burgundy,US] () {} − c <∏ (Diff )if it labels both wines “Burgundy” so 
it will not do so in equilibrium. 
Finally, comparing ∏(NoDiff ) with ∏(Diff ), we see that ∏(Diff ) >∏ (NoDiff) 
iff  ( ) ββ β +−>− ⇔< + = [| , ] ( 1 ) [| , ]
C C E qB u r gundy US u c u c u E q Burgundy US c . It 
follows from this that (i) the producer labels exactly one wine “Burgundy” when  < cc , 
(ii) the producer labels both wines “Table” when  > cc , and (iii) there exists an 
equilibrium such that the producer labels both wines “Table” when  = cc . (***) 
The statements of Propositions 5 and 6 follow from (*), (**), and (***).■ 
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Appendix 2:  “More Bayesian” Updating Rule 
  In this appendix, we explore the alternative, “more Bayesian,” updating rule for 
coarse thinkers presented in equations (2.4)-(2.5).   Recall that this update rule is different 
in one key way from that in our primary model: the coarse thinker conditions on the 
information received in weighing the expectation of quality in a situation.  Under this 
update rule, conditional on choosing a category (which still depends on the data 
received), the coarse thinker can simply be thought of as a Bayesian whose information 
set contains only the knowledge of the category but not that of the situation.  We state 
and prove natural analogs to Propositions 2 and 3 under these alternative assumptions and 
demonstrate that the results presented in Section 2 are largely robust. 
  Equilibrium is defined as in the main text for the case of a coarse, sophisticated 
audience except the persuader is now assumed to maximize  
 
E[q |r,m,C(r,m)] if m = x
E[q |r,m,C(r,m)]− c if m ≠ x
 (A2.1) 
(rather than (3.2)) taking the audience’s beliefs  ˆ pas given.  The persuader is allowed to 
use mixed strategies. 
  We now characterize some optimal (equilibrium) strategies of the persuader when 
the audience consists of sophisticated coarse thinkers under this alternative updating rule.  
Fix public information r and, without loss of generality, assume that C(r) = C1.  First, 
consider the case where messages are not pivotal given r.  Also, without loss of 
generality, suppose that private signal x = a is more favorable than private signal x = b in 
s = 1 in the following sense: 
  E[q | r,a,s =1]p(s =1|r,a,C1) ≥ E[q | r,b,s =1]p(s =1|r,b,C1) (A2.2) 52 
We have the following proposition: 
Proposition A2.1 (Transference):  Suppose individuals are sophisticated coarse thinkers 
under the modified updating rule, that messages are not pivotal given public information 
r, and that condition (A2.2) holds.  Then an optimal strategy of the persuader in situation 
s = 0 may involve the creation of a message.  Specifically, so long as  
  c < E[q | r,a,s =1]p(s =1|r,a,C1)− E[q | r,b,s =1]p(s =1|r,b,C1) (A2.3) 
it cannot be optimal for the persuader in situation s = 0 to always report the private 
signal.  Further, if the inequality in (A2.3) holds, then there always exists an optimal 
strategy such that the persuader replaces x = b with m = a with positive probability given 
r. 
Proof:  See online appendix. ■ 
We now consider the case where categorization depends on the exact message the 
persuader sends, i.e., one message is pivotal.  To limit the number of cases, suppose that 
message m = a is pivotal and that the persuader weakly “prefers” private signal x = a 
over private signal x = b: 
  E[q | r,a,s = 2]p(s = 2|r,a,C2) ≥ E[q | r,b,s =1]p(s =1|r,b,C1) (A2.4) 
Since message m = a is pivotal, it does not matter whether or not (A2.2) still holds. 
We then have:            
Proposition A2.2 (Framing): Suppose individuals are sophisticated coarse thinkers 
under the modified updating rule, that message m = a is pivotal given public information 
r, and that condition (A2.4) holds.  Then an optimal strategy of the persuader in situation 
s = 0 may involve the creation of a message.  Specifically, so long as  
  c < E[q | r,a,s =1]p(s = 2|r,a,C2)− E[q | r,b,s =1]p(s =1|r,b,C1) (A2.5) 53 
it cannot be optimal for the persuader in situation s = 0 to always report the private 
signal.  Further, if the inequality in (A2.5) holds, then there always exists an optimal 
strategy such that the persuader replaces x = b with m = a with positive probability given 
r. 
Proof: See online appendix.  ■ 
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